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AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF LIMITED RECOURSE  PROJECT 
FINANCE 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This paper provides the first full-length empirical analysis of project finance, which is defined as 
"limited or non-recourse financing of a newly to be developed project through the establishment of a 
vehicle company."  We compare the characteristics of a sample of 4,956 project finance loans (worth 
$634 billion) to comparable samples of non-project finance loans, all of which are drawn from a 
comprehensive sample of 90,784 syndicated loans (worth $13.2 trillion) booked on international capital 
markets since 1980. We find that project finance (PF) loans differ significantly from non-project finance 
loans in that PF loans have a longer average maturity, are more likely to have third-party guarantees, and 
are far more likely to be extended to non-US borrowers and to borrowers in riskier countries. PF credits 
also involve more participating banks, have fewer loan covenants, are more likely to use fixed-rate rather 
than floating-rate loan pricing, and are more likely to be extended to borrowers in tangible-asset-rich 
industries such as real estate, and electric utilities. Despite being non-recourse finance, floating-rate PF 
loans have lower credit spreads (over LIBOR) than do most comparable non-PF loans. Contrary to 
expectations, we find that PF loans are not larger than non-PF loans, but are in fact significantly smaller 
than corporate control or capital structure loans (two of the four non-PF loan samples examined). Loan 
pricing regression analysis reveals that PF and non-PF loans are funded in segmented capital markets, 
with spreads on PF loans being influenced both by different factors and to different degrees by common 
factors.  PF loan spreads are directly related to borrower country risk, the use of covenants in the loan 
contract, and project leverage. Spreads are also higher when a borrower is in a tangible-asset-rich 
industry, and loan spreads and fees are shown to be complements rather than supplements. The presence 
of a third-party guarantee significantly reduces PF loan spreads, while loan size and maturity generally do 
not influence PF loan pricing. Though direct comparisons of the leverage ratios of project finance vehicle 
companies and the operating companies that arrange most syndicated loans are not possible, we do find 
that projects funded with PF loans are indeed heavily leveraged—with an average loan to project value 
ratio of 67 percent. Finally, when we apply an organizational choice model to a large sample of loans 
extended to borrowers in industries, which frequently use project finance, we are able to achieve out-of-
sample predictive accuracy of almost 80 percent.  
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AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF LIMITED RECOURSE PROJECT FINANCE 
 
1.  Introduction 
During the past two decades, an important new method of financing large-scale, high-risk 
domestic and international business ventures has emerged. This technology, called project finance, is 
usually defined as limited or non-recourse financing of a newly to be developed project through the 
establishment of a vehicle company (separate incorporation). Thus the distinguishing features of project 
finance (PF) are, first, that creditors share much of the venture's business risk and, second, that funding is 
obtained strictly for the project itself without an expectation that the corporate or government sponsor will 
co-insure the project's debt--at least not fully.   
Project finance was first used on a large scale to develop the North Sea oil fields during the 
1970s, where the scale and risk of the investment required far exceeded the capabilities of any single 
petroleum company, or even any single consortium of companies.1 Following the success of the North 
Sea developments, PF has been used extensively to develop natural resource, electric power, 
transportation, and numerous other ventures around the world.  PF has been associated with many 
financial and operating success stories. These include the Teeside Power project in the UK, the Ras 
Laffan LNG project in Qatar, the Hopewell Partners Guangzhou Highway in southern China, and the 
Petrozuata heavy oil project in Venezuela (see Esty and Millett (1998)), as well as numerous independent 
power generation projects in the United States.  However, PF is most closely associated in the public 
mind with three spectacular recent financial failures--the Channel Tunnel (Eurotunnel), the EuroDisney 
theme park outside of Paris, and the Dabhol power project in India.  In spite of these failures, total PF 
lending worldwide has exceeded $36 billion every year since 1989, and reached a peak of $85 billion in 
                                                     
1  If project finance is defined more generally as limited recourse financing of stand-alone projects, Kensinger and 
Martin (1988) quite rightly point out that this financing technique predates stocks or bonds by several centuries. The 
“modern” form of PF--using a separately-incorporated vehicle company (governed by British or U.S. commercial 
law), syndicated loan financing, and sophisticated contractual allocation of project risks and responsibilities—is, 
however, a much more recent invention. 
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1997 before dropping back to $54 billion during the following year’s global economic turmoil. 
Given its increasing importance as a funding vehicle, it is not surprising that PF has attracted a 
great deal of academic interest, though the vast majority of published articles and working papers are 
theoretical rather than empirical studies. The financial packages themselves offer rich opportunities for 
testing core financial theories using a sample of large, self-contained financial contracts that must both 
allocate risk and solve basic agency problems between sponsors and creditors.  Several theoretical studies 
examine the characteristic “separate incorporation” feature of project finance. Shah and Thakor (1987) 
develop a theory of optimal capital structure based on corporate taxes and informational asymmetries, and 
then use this theory to explain the choice of PF as an organizational form.  In their model, some project 
values are maximized with separate incorporation (project financing)—and these will have systematically 
higher leverage ratios than will conventionally-financed projects—because creditors incur lower 
screening costs in evaluating separately-incorporated project cash flows.  
In contrast to Shah and Thakor, Chemmanur and John (1996) develop a symmetric information 
model of project finance choice that is driven by considerations of the benefits of corporate control. They 
assert that the control benefits of a particular project are a function of its operating characteristics, and 
predict that an entrepreneur will seek to maximize the sum of the present value of control benefits (which 
cannot be contracted away) and security benefits (which can).  They then specify the determinants of the 
optimal organizational choice as a function of firm size, the entrepreneur’s ability in managing the 
specific project (versus other projects under her control), and the level of control benefits and the rate 
they decline with increasing levels of debt. Generally, the project with the smaller control benefits per 
dollar of value will be structured as project finance (separately incorporated), and will be allocated a 
higher debt ratio.  Chemmanur (1997) also develops a theory of project finance, but his model explains 
separate incorporation primarily as an attempt by firms to protect the credit rating of the parent firm, since 
financing projects through separate subsidiaries may serve to minimize reputation spill-over effects from 
an ancillary activity.  
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Several other streams of theoretical research address other characteristics of project finance, 
besides the distinctive separate incorporation feature. Numerous recent theoretical breakthroughs in the 
analysis of secured debt financing, the maturity structure of debt contracts, the choice between private 
debt (bank loans) and public debt (bonds and notes), the role of covenants and collateral in debt contracts, 
the optimal design of securities, and the monitoring role of financial intermediaries have all yielded 
important insights about the observed structure of project finance loans.  While an in-depth analysis of 
this literature is beyond our scope here, key articles include secured debt financing studies by Berkovitch 
and Kim (1990) and Habib and Johnson (1999); theoretical and empirical analyses of debt maturity 
structure by Diamond (1991a, 1993), Barclay and Smith (1995), and Guedes and Opler (1996); analyses 
of the choice between privately and publicly-placed debt presented in Diamond (1991b), Rajan (1992), 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994), Houston and James (1996), and Repullo and Suarez (1998); theoretical 
and empirical studies of covenant and collateral usage by Smith and Warner (1979), Berger and Udell 
(1990), El-Gazzar and Pastena (1990), and Rajan and Winton (1995); theoretical models of optimal 
security design presented in Boot and Thakor (1993), Boyd and Smith (1994), and Harris and Raviv 
(1995); and financial intermediation papers by Diamond (1984, 1989), Allen (1990), Bizer and DeMarzo 
(1992), Johnson (1997), and Allen and Santomero (1998).  
The studies cited above collectively help explain several of the stylized facts about project 
finance presented in three excellent practitioner-oriented overviews by Kensinger and Martin (1988), 
Smith and Walter (1990), and Brealey, Cooper, and Habib (1996). These commentators assert that PF will 
most commonly be used for capital-intensive projects, with relatively transparent cash flows, in riskier-
than-average countries, using relatively long-term financing, and employing far more detailed loan 
covenants than will conventionally-financed projects. Brealey, Cooper, and Habib also stress that one of 
the key comparative advantages of project finance is that it allows the allocation of specific project risks 
(i.e., completion and operating risk, revenue and price risk, and the risk of political interference or 
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expropriation) to those parties best able to manage them.2 To our knowledge, however, no full-scale 
empirical study of project finance has yet been published--apart from Kleimeier and Megginson (1998, 
2000), who compare PF in Asia with that in the West and PF with standard syndicated loans, respectively. 
Our paper seeks to remedy this gap in the literature. 
Specifically, our study has three principal objectives.  The first is descriptive.  Using a 
comprehensive sample of over 90,000 syndicated loans (worth over $13 trillion) booked on international 
capital markets since 1980, we compare the financial characteristics and geographic and industrial 
distributions of 4,956 PF loans with various non-PF loan sub-samples and with the full sample of all 
syndicated loans. Second, we perform OLS regression analyses of the determinants of loan pricing 
(spreads) for PF and non-PF loans both to determine if PF and non-PF loans are priced in a single 
integrated market, and to study how borrower and loan-specific factors influence credit spreads. Finally, 
we estimate an organizational choice model using probit and logit regression techniques, and then apply 
this to a hold-out sample of loans to determine whether we can predict the choice between traditional and 
project finance based on observable loan characteristics. We focus this analysis on those industries where 
PF is used most frequently in order to neutralize as much as possible the influence of asset characteristics 
and the operating environment on the project financing choice. 
 This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the Loanware database used in this study, 
and also analyzes the industrial and geographic patterns observed for PF versus non-PF lending. The 25 
largest project finance deals arranged since 1980 are also described here. In section 3 the financial 
characteristics of PF loans are compared to the population of all syndicated loans, as well as to four non-
PF loan sub-samples. Univariate tests of significant differences between the PF and non-PF loan samples 
are also presented here. Section 4 presents our separate loan pricing regression analyses of the PF and 
                                                     
2 Other PF studies include Rendell and Niehuss (1983), John and John (1988), World Bank (1994b), Lang (1998), 
IFC (1999), and Dailami and Leipziger (2000). Focusing on the application of PF to projects in Asia, Lang presents 
an in-depth analysis of PF and of its requirements for successful implementation in Asia. He also provides detailed 
descriptions of several actual projects. Dailami and Leipzier investigate the risk premia paid on 27 private foreign 
currency loans to infrastructure projects in developing countries, but they do not distinguish in their analysis between 
full-recourse loans and non-recourse project finance loans. Instead they focus on macroeconomic factors, project 
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non-PF loan samples, and tests whether these loans are funded and priced in a single integrated market or 
in segmented markets. More in-depth pricing analyses of the main PF sample, plus several sub-samples 
created based on data availability, are presented in section 5. Our organizational choice (logit and probit 
regression) models are discussed and applied in section 6, and section 7 concludes the study. 
 
2.   The Loanware database  
The principal data source used in this study is the Loanware database provided by Capital DATA, 
a London-based joint venture company between Euromoney plc and Computasoft Ltd. This database 
contains detailed historical information on virtually the entire population of syndicated loans and related 
banking instruments that are booked on national and international capital markets from January 1, 1980 
through March 23, 1999.3 While the file contains information on both signed and unsigned loans, we 
examine only loans that are actually agreed-to by the contracting parties (signed loans), though we do 
include the roughly one-eighth of all loans that are subsequently canceled.  We also require that the loan 
size (in $US millions) be available. After applying these two screens, we are able to examine a total of 
90,784 loans (worth $13.2 trillion), of which 4,956 loans (worth $634.4 billion) have a loan purpose code 
of Project Finance. We verify with Capital DATA that this screen refers to loans made to a vehicle 
company, so we refer to this as our “full project finance loan sample,” while we call the larger dataset our 
“all syndicated loan sample.”  
2.1. The industrial and geographic distribution of project finance loans 
The full project finance and all syndicated loan samples are described in Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 
presents the industrial distribution of the full sample of all loans and the project finance sample, while 
Table 2 presents the geographic distribution of both loan samples.  Both tables reveal striking differences 
between project finance lending and more traditional syndicated lending, and these differences largely 
                                                                                                                                                                           
size, leverage, and industry as the determinants of the risk premia. 
3  Though the database is updated weekly, we freeze the sample as of this date for the current analysis. We will 
update the sample throughout the journal review process. 
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verify the standard picture that is drawn about project finance. Table 1 shows that PF loans are highly 
concentrated in five key industries, whereas the general population of syndicated loans reveals a far less 
concentrated industrial pattern. No less than 60.2 percent of all project lending (by value) and 46.3 
percent of all PF loans are made to borrowers in the communications, mining and natural resources, oil 
and gas, electricity and energy utility, and transportation (excluding airlines and shipping) industries. 
These industries account for only 21.8 percent of all syndicated lending (value) and a mere 17.1 percent 
of all syndicated loans. This finding is consistent with the received wisdom that project finance is used 
primarily to fund tangible-asset-rich and capital intensive projects with relatively transparent (often hard-
currency) cash flows. This conclusion is reinforced by the observation that all of the other “over-
represented” industries for PF lending (i.e., construction/heavy engineering, hotels and leisure, 
petrochemicals) can be described similarly.  
**** Insert Tables 1 & 2 about here **** 
Table 2 also presents a revealing difference between the countries which attract PF lending and 
those where other types of syndicated credits are directed. Whereas the vast bulk of general syndicated 
lending is concentrated in the United States (61.4 percent by value and 56.6 percent of all loans), only 
16.8 percent of PF lending and only 14.7 percent of PF loans go to U.S. borrowers. The biggest recipient 
of PF lending is south-east Asia. This region accounts for 23.8 percent of the total value--and no less than 
30.3 percent of the total number--of project finance loans, whereas it accounts for a mere 5.2 percent of 
the value (and 10.8 percent of the number) of all syndicated lending. Closer analysis reveals that PF 
lending to south-east Asia peaked in 1996, and has fallen dramatically since then, but this region was the 
heart and soul of PF lending for almost a decade prior to that date—with Indonesia and China being the 
two favorite target countries.  Intriguingly, U.K. borrowers are more heavily represented in the PF sample 
than in the full syndicated loan sample (14.5 percent by value versus 9.3 percent), although the rest of 
western Europe accounts for an almost identical fraction  (10.3 versus 10.4 percent) of both types of 
lending. This preference of project finance lenders for British borrowers is not merely an artifact of the 
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disproportionately large Eurotunnel loans (discussed below). It also reflects the emphasis placed by the 
Conservative Thatcher and Major governments (and now the Labor government of Tony Blair) on the 
private rather than public financing of large infrastructure projects—many of which have proven to be 
remarkably successful, both financially and operationally. As a whole, these geographic lending patterns 
are consistent with the widely held belief that project finance is a particularly appropriate method of 
funding projects in relatively risky (non-OECD) countries. 
2.2. Characteristics of the largest project finance deals 
Table 3 presents key details regarding the 25 largest project finance loan packages arranged since 
1980. These are listed by the total value of the project, since some packages have as many as four 
separate loan tranches--which are listed separately, with their corresponding financial information, within 
each project’s cell in the table. There are a total of 46 loans associated with these 25 project finance 
packages, or an average of 1.84 loans per project finance deal. The infamous Eurotunnel project has the 
distinction of being both the largest and second largest project financing in history, though the $13.2 
billion loan in June 1990 was only a refinancing of the original $7.9 billion loan package arranged in 
August 1987. These 25 deals reveal many of the key features commonly associated with project finance. 
In all cases, borrowing is done through a newly created vehicle company set up to finance, build, and 
operate the project. Additionally, project sponsors are usually well known international operating 
companies, state-owned enterprises, and/or governmental bodies that are joined together through 
ownership of the vehicle company and by the supplemental project financing contractual agreements. 
Further, the loans themselves tend to be relatively long-term credits, and are priced at a fixed spread 
above a benchmark interest rate, typically the London Inter-Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR).  Another 
distinctive feature of these loans is that they frequently include a loan tranche that is fully or partially 
guaranteed by a creditworthy third party, usually a developed country’s export credit agency (though the 
World Bank is a frequent guarantor of smaller PF loans in this database).  
**** Insert Table 3 about here **** 
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Perhaps the most telling difference between the large PF loans detailed in Table 3 and more 
traditional syndicated credits is the use to which they are put. Whereas (as we will discuss in detail below) 
most non-PF loans are arranged to finance acquisitions or LBOs, for refinancing existing financing 
facilities, or for general corporate purposes, all of the large PF loan packages are associated with specific 
construction projects--though three are refinancing of earlier credits.  No less than seven of these involve 
telecommunications projects, with five being arranged to finance the rollout of mobile phone networks. 
An additional five packages are arranged to build rail, tunnel, or subway projects, while four are 
dedicated to constructing electrical utility or cogeneration facilities. Four of the remaining loan packages 
are allocated to petrochemical projects, and two are arranged to finance the construction of cross-border 
natural gas pipelines. Once again, the received wisdom regarding project finance rings true: at least the 
largest such loan packages are complex, international financial deals involving a vehicle company owned 
by multiple sponsors, and are arranged to fund development of large, tangible-asset-based projects. The 
loans are often guaranteed by third parties (though the entire package rarely is—only individual loan 
tranches), and the projects are often located in relatively risky countries.  We now turn to a direct 
comparison of PF loans with various subsamples of non-PF loans, categorized by their intended use. 
 
3. Financial characteristics of project finance versus non-project finance loans  
Panel A of Table 4 presents basic financial characteristics for the full sample of all syndicated 
loans, the full sample of PF loans, and four additional, non-overlapping samples of syndicated loans 
classified by loan purpose. The category of corporate control loans includes those credits with loan 
purposes codes indicating that they are being arranged to fund acquisitions, leveraged buyouts, or 
employee stock option plans. Capital structure loans are those booked in order to repay maturing lines of 
credit or for recapitalizations, share repurchases, debtor in possession financing, standby commercial 
paper support, or other (unspecified) refinancing. Fixed asset based loans have loan purpose codes 
indicating they are intended for mortgage lending or to fund purchases of aircraft, property, or shipping. 
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The general corporate purpose loans category includes loans with that as their stated purpose, as well as 
credits with an empty loan purpose code. Loans with other purposes are not grouped here into a separate 
category, though they are included in the full sample of syndicated loans. 4  This categorization strategy, 
though admittedly ad hoc, effectively groups together loans having similar corporate purposes and 
provides a manageable set of loan type samples that can be directly compared to each other.5 
**** Insert Table 4 about here **** 
Panel A of Table 4 reveals striking—and highly significant--differences both between PF and 
non-PF loans, as well as between the various categories of traditional loans. One of the most dramatic 
findings is how much larger are corporate control and capital structure loans than other loan types. These 
credits have mean (median) values of $212 million ($59 million) and $209 million ($65 million), 
respectively, compared with $146 million ($50 million) for the full population of all syndicated loans and 
a “mere” $88 million ($50 million) for fixed asset based loans. The converse of this result is the 
surprising finding that project finance loans are, on average, $18 million smaller than the general 
population of syndicated loans ($128 million versus $146 million), though the median PF loan size is $2 
million greater ($52 million versus $50 million). These relative size differences remain even when size is 
expressed as the total value of all loan tranches rather than as individual loans. While the size difference 
between PF and corporate control loans can be explained away by stressing that the latter involves 
purchasing an entire company, the fact remains that PF loans are not abnormally large financing 
vehicles—but rather fall well within the mainstream of syndicated lending.   
According to all four of the remaining variables in Table 4’s Panel A, however, PF loans are 
substantially different financial instruments.  The average maturity of PF loans, 8.6 years, is almost twice 
                                                     
4  We also grouped these credits into an “Other loans” sample, and subjected these to the same basic tests as the five 
principal categories. This sample was very similar to our “General corporate purpose loans” sample in general 
characteristics, so we do not report these tests here in the interests of space. These results are available upon request. 
5  We should point out that hitting on the precisely “appropriate” method of categorizing non-PF loans is not critical 
to our main empirical objective in this and the next section, which is to test whether PF and non-PF loans are 
significantly different financial instruments. Our results are very robust to most non-PF loan classification schemes, 
though the observed similarity between PF and fixed asset-based loans does make the selection criteria for that 
category important. Fortunately, these are the easiest non-PF loans to identify.  
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that of the full population of syndicated loans, and is comparable only to the 8.1 year average of fixed 
asset based loans. Additionally, compared to the overall sample of syndicated loans and most of the sub-
samples, PF loans are more than twice as likely to be fixed rate credits (13.9 percent versus 5.9 percent). 
Further, those PF loans that are priced as a floating rate use LIBOR as a pricing base far less frequently 
(38.8 percent) than the full syndicated loan sample (69.5 percent).6  Perhaps the single most remarkable 
difference between PF and all non-PF loans is how infrequently project finance loans are extended to U.S. 
borrowers. Whereas American corporations (and occasionally governmental units) arrange 55.8 percent 
of all syndicated loans, by value, and account for fully 74.0 percent of capital structure lending, U.S. 
borrowers account for a mere 13.9 percent of project finance lending. The only other category of loans 
with a similar non-U.S. flavor are the fixed asset based credits, which we will find share many important 
characteristics with PF loans. 
3.1. Loan pricing samples    
 One of the most important objectives of this study is to determine whether PF loans are more or 
less expensive for borrowers than are other types of loans. To address this issue, we select from the 
sample of all syndicated loans those credits which are both priced as floating rate loans and which use 
LIBOR as a base interest rate.  We also screen for complete data on borrower nationality and loan 
currency denomination. These screens yield a set of “high-information” loan samples with comparable 
pricing data expressed, in basis points, as spreads above LIBOR. These are presented in Panel B of Table 
4, beginning with the full sample of 40,073 high-information syndicated loans. The various loan purpose 
sub-samples are presented next, beginning with the 1,824 project finance loans priced as a spread over 
LIBOR. The relatively low “survival rate” of PF loans from the full sample to the high-information sub-
sample (36.8 percent of the original 4,956 loans) is due to their pricing characteristics.  As noted earlier, 
PF loans are more commonly fixed price credits than are other types of loans and fewer of the floating 
                                                     
6  After LIBOR, the next most common bases for pricing project finance loans are the Singapore and Hong Kong 
Inter-Bank Offered Rates (SIBOR and HIBOR), with 118 and 82 loans, respectively. A surprisingly large number of 
1,830 PF loans list a spread, in basis points (thus confirming they are floating rate credits), but do not specify the 
base against which the loan is priced. Running our main analyses with these classified as LIBOR-based loans yields 
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rate PF loans are priced versus LIBOR. Nonetheless, a comparison of the variables common to the loan 
samples in Panels A and B reveals that the high-information PF loans in Panel B are not dissimilar to their 
counterparts in Panel A in terms of average loan size, maturity, and frequency of U.S. borrowers. The 
same is true for the other loan type sub-samples, so we will assume that any empirical results derived 
from the high-information sub-samples are generalizeable to the larger population of all loans. 
 In addition to the variables discussed earlier, Table 4’s Panel B presents several new loan 
structure variables as well as greater detail about borrowers and the use for which a loan is arranged. Most 
of these are self-explanatory (i.e., fee levels, number of banks in a syndicate, loans with guarantees), but a 
few require definition.  We define a loan as having currency risk if the denomination of the loan (and its 
currency of repayment) differs from the currency of the borrower’s home country. Thus a Japanese 
borrower arranging a dollar loan would be subject to currency risk, whereas that same borrower arranging 
a yen-denominated loan would not be. Country risk rank and country risk score are taken directly from 
the semi-annual country risk tabulation in Euromoney magazine. A low-risk country will have a very low 
rank but a very high score. For example, Luxembourg and the United States were ranked 1 and 2 in late 
1998 (Switzerland also typically ranks very high), but Luxembourg’s score was 98.9 and the U.S.’ score 
was 97.85. On the other hand, extremely risky countries have high rankings and low scores (in late 1998, 
North Korea and Afghanistan had rankings of 179 and 180, respectively, and scores of 2.25 and 2.01).  
While we report both risk rank and risk scores in Panel B, in the interest of space we will subsequently 
report only empirical results using country risk rank data, since this is the only risk measure reported by 
Euromoney during the 1980-1982 period. As will be discussed more fully below, rank also has 
econometric advantages in the loan pricing regressions, since it assigns an increasing value to countries 
with higher risk—which is also how spreads should be correlated with risk. In all cases, the results using 
country risk score are qualitatively similar, though the regression intercepts differ substantially.  
The variable loans with covenants indicates whether the loan agreement legally imposes any of 
                                                                                                                                                                           
qualitatively similar results. 
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the standard positive or negative covenants on the borrower. Since this variable suffers from a missing 
value problem (an empty cell may mean that the loan has no covenants or that the data is unavailable), we 
report it simply as the fraction of each loan type with covenants included. Finally, the variable loans to 
collateralizeable asset-rich borrowers is a dummy variable coded as 1 if the borrower is operating in an 
industry generally believed to be rich in non-specialized, tangible (and thus collateralizeable) assets. 
Specifically, this means that the loan recipient has a business borrower code of airlines, apartment 
management, electricity utility, hotels and leisure, property, REIT, or shipping. Both the theoretical and 
empirical capital structure literature (see especially Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim (1984)) indicates that 
companies with many such assets should be able to tolerate heavier debt levels than other companies. 
Panel C of Table 4 provides t-tests comparing the values of each variable in the high-information PF loan 
sample with the corresponding values in the (high-information) all syndicated loan sample and in the 
other four loan purpose sub-samples. The numbers in this panel are t-statistics and almost all of the pair-
wise comparisons indicate statistically significant differences between the PF sample values and the 
corresponding values for other loan categories. 
 The relative pricing of PF versus non-PF loans is one of the most important, and surprising, 
findings detailed in Panel B of Table 4. Average loan spreads are statistically and economically 
significantly lower for PF loans (130 bp) than they are for corporate control loans (195 bp), capital 
structure loans (135 bp) and the full sample of all syndicated loans (134 bp). Most observers would have 
predicted that PF loans have higher spreads than non-PF loans, since loan repayment is not guaranteed by 
the project’s sponsor (limited or non-recourse lending) and because of most projects’ higher perceived 
risk levels.  
The observed level of loan fees and the number of participating banks do provide indirect 
evidence that PF lending may well be considered relatively more risky than other types of lending—or at 
least more difficult to arrange. The average levels of commitment and participation fees for PF loans 
(36.9 and 56.3 bp, respectively) are significantly higher than the levels for the full sample of syndicated 
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loans (30.8 and 36.9 bp), as well as for every sub-sample except corporate control loans. Additionally, the 
average number of banks participating in PF loans (14.5 banks) is significantly larger than the average for 
all loans (10.7 banks) and the average for every other loan sub-sample. These findings suggest that banks 
must be compensated with relatively high up-front fee payments to entice them to participate in project 
finance lending, and they are apparently unwilling to take as large a stake in PF loans as they would in 
other credits. Either that or they wish to increase the number of banks participating in a PF credit of a 
given size in order to spread risks over a larger number of banks for some other reason, such as to build 
political support. We will examine loan pricing more fully in the next section, when we employ OLS 
regression to determine what factors influence loan spreads. 
 Most of the non-price variables detailed in Panel B clearly suggest that PF loans are often similar 
to fixed asset based loans (FAB), but are otherwise fundamentally different financial instruments from 
other loan types. As before, a far lower fraction of both PF and FAB loans are arranged for U.S. 
borrowers (11.6 and 13.4 percent) than is true for the overall sample of all syndicated loans (56.9 
percent), and these loans also have much longer average maturity (8.6 and 7.7 years versus 4.8 years). 
Additionally, PF and FAB loans are much more likely to be subject to currency risk than are other loan 
types (72.9 and 71.0 percent for PF and FAB loans, respectively, versus 33.1 percent for all syndicated 
loans). Given the non-U.S. nature of typical PF and FAB borrowers, coupled with the fact that syndicated 
loans are overwhelmingly dollar-denominated, this high level of currency risk is not surprising. 
Furthermore, a significantly larger fraction of PF and FAB loans carry third-party guarantees (34.1 and 
34.5 percent, respectively) than of the full sample of all syndicated loans (13.3 percent) or any other sub-
sample. 
 PF and FAB loans share one other intriguing (and surprising) common feature--they are far less 
likely to contain loan covenants than are all other loan types. Only 3.4 percent of PF loans, and 7.1 
percent of FAB loans, have at least one positive or negative loan covenant versus 30.5 percent of all 
syndicated credits and 42.4 percent of capital structure loans. We are frankly at a loss to explain why 
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FAB loans have so few covenants—unless these are primarily mortgages, specifically tied to individual 
assets, which give creditors senior enough positions not to require separate loan covenants. We can, 
however, offer two possible explanations for the absence of covenants for project finance loans—which 
received wisdom suggests should be loaded with exquisitely detailed contractual provisions. First, since 
this database details PF loans, rather than the full financial deals themselves, it is likely that the explicit 
debt covenants for project finance packages are covered by a separate contract (the project financing 
package), so the PF loans themselves are simply one part of a much larger deal. No such separate contract 
governs a takeover loan or a debt refinancing credit extended to an operating company, however, so in 
those cases the covenants are included in the loans themselves. The second hypothesis really has greater 
implications for general corporate finance than for a project finance study, though the separate 
incorporation feature of PF is central to its logic. Since loan covenants are designed in part to protect the 
creditor from asset substitution and other methods of wealth expropriation by the borrower, it follows that 
these clauses are far less necessary for loans to a special-purpose vehicle company than they are for loans 
made to a complex, multi-divisional corporation. 
 For three of the characteristics detailed in Panel B, PF and FAB loans differ significantly from 
each other—though they remain more similar than in comparison to other loan categories. The first two 
such features are the country risk measures. PF loan borrowers are, on average, located in far riskier 
countries than is the case for any other loan category. The average country risk rank for PF borrowers 
(31.8) is significantly higher than the corresponding value for FAB loans (21.3), and is dramatically 
higher than the average risk rank for all syndicated loans (12.8). Using late-1998 Euromoney scores, this 
suggests that the typical syndicated loan is arranged for a borrower in Sweden, a typical FAB loan would 
go to a borrower in Singapore, while the typical PF credit would be arranged for a company in Bahrain. 
Average country risk scores for PF, FAB, and all syndicated loan borrowers (74.6, 82.7, and 90.0, 
respectively) tell a similar story, corresponding as they do to arranging loans for borrowers in Qatar, 
Cyprus, and Australia. Clearly, project finance loans involve significantly greater political and economic 
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risk than any other major category of syndicated credit.  
Perhaps one reason PF loans can be made to relatively risky borrowers is because they are much 
more likely to be arranged for collateralizeable asset-rich projects than is the case for the average 
syndicated loan. Over one-quarter (27.7 percent) of PF loans are extended for such projects, versus only 
14.2 percent of all syndicated loans. On the other hand, the fraction of FAB loans arranged for this type of 
borrower, 69.5 percent, is the highest of any loan category—which is not surprising since this category 
was defined to be tangible asset rich.  
Before proceeding to a multivariate regression analysis of loan pricing, we should briefly 
summarize the results of our univariate comparisons between PF loans and other loan types.  Project 
finance loans fall, on average, in the middle range of all syndicated lending in terms of size and loan 
spread (price).  On the other hand, PF loans have much longer average maturity and are more likely to be 
fixed rather than floating rate credits (and are less likely to be priced relative to LIBOR if they are 
floating rate). American companies use project finance only sparingly; whereas over half of all syndicated 
loans are arranged for U.S. borrowers, only one-eighth of PF loans are booked for American vehicle 
companies. In fact, the average PF loan borrower resides in a much riskier country than is true for 
syndicated lending in general, and PF lending is significantly more likely to be arranged for a tangible 
asset rich project. Finally, PF loans share many similarities with fixed asset based credits—such as 
borrower nationality, average loan size and maturity, frequent use of third-party guarantees, and 
infrequent use of loan covenants. On the other hand, they also differ in being more expensive than FAB 
loans and in being extended to relatively riskier, and less tangible-asset rich borrowers.   
 
4. Loan pricing regression analyses 
 
In this section, we subject the various high-information loan samples detailed in Table 4, Panel B 
to OLS regression analysis. Our purposes in doing this are three-fold. First, we wish to determine which 
of the variables detailed in Table 4 have significant, independent influences on loan spreads once the 
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effects of other variables are accounted for. Second, we wish to determine whether the several categories 
of loans are priced in the same way—whether the coefficient values and number of significant factors is 
the same between all of the groups. This is equivalent to testing whether these different loan types are 
priced in segmented or integrated capital markets. Finally, we wish to determine whether PF loans are 
more or less expensive than other types of loans—again, after accounting for other factors.  
The academic literature contains numerous examples of loan pricing studies, using both bank 
loans and publicly-traded debt.  Theoretical pricing models are presented in Merton (1984), Black and 
Cox (1976), Eaton, Gersovitz, and Stiglitz (1986), Maksimovic (1990), Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), 
and Duffee (1998).  Empirical pricing studies include Smith (1980), Edwards (1984, 1986), Melnik and 
Plaut (1986), Scott and Smith (1986), Berger and Udell (1990), Boehmer and Megginson (1990), Booth 
(1992), Petersen and Rajan (1994), Chen, Mazumdar, and Hung (1996), Blackwell and Winters (1997), 
Chen, Mazumdar, and Yan (2000), and Eichengreen and Mody (2000).7 The loan pricing tests we perform 
are most similar to those presented in Booth (1992), both in the actual model estimated and in the average 
size of loans under examination. Our sample size is, however, many times larger than in Booth or almost 
any other study cited above. 
We estimate the determinants of loan pricing using the model described in equation 1. The 
dependent variable is the loan spread above LIBOR, in basis points, and the independent variables are 
those presented and discussed in Table 4. We employ standard OLS regression estimation techniques and 
adjust for heteroskedasticity using the methodology proposed by White (1980). The model estimated is:  
 
 
Spread = α + β1 Size + β2 Maturity + β3 Guarantee + β4 Currency Risk + β5 Country Risk Rank 
+ β6 Collateralizeable Assets    (1)  
                                                     
7  Although Carey, Post, and Sharpe (1998) do not estimate a loan pricing model, per se, this paper is also relevant 
here because they do examine the influence of borrower risk and information asymmetries on the credit decisions of 
financial intermediaries. Several other papers provide useful information on the U.S. syndicated loan market (Booth 
and Chua (1995), Barnish, Miller, and Rushmore (1997), Culp and Neves (1998)), the structures employed for 
international syndicated lending (Chowdry (1991)), and the importance of third-party guarantees in PF lending 
(World Bank (1994a,c), Mody and Patro (1995)). 
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Where: 
 Size = Loan size, in US$ millions; 
 Maturity = Loan maturity, in years; 
Guarantee = Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a loan has a third-party guarantee and 0 
otherwise; 
Currency Risk = Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a loan is exposed to currency risk (the 
currency of the loan repayment cash flows differs from the borrower’s home country currency), and 0 
otherwise; 
 Country Risk Rank = Country risk rank, an integer ranking of country risk provided by 
Euromoney every year, where low risk countries have low ranks (Luxembourg =1 in late-1998) and high 
risk countries have high ranks (North Korea = 179); 
 Collateralizeable Assets = Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the borrower is in an industry 
generally considered to be rich in collateralizeable (tangible, non-specialized) assets, and 0 otherwise. 
 
 We employ country risk rank as our measure of country risk, rather than risk score, both because 
this yields two additional years of data, and because this measure increases with country risk--which 
lends itself to a more logical interpretation of the coefficient on the risk variable coefficient. For example, 
if rank’s coefficient value is 1.50, this implies that a loan booked to a borrower in a country with a risk 
ranking of 40 will on average have a spread 15 basis points higher than a loan to a borrower in a country 
with a rank of 30.  
We should also explicitly state that this model does not have a variable measuring credit risk in 
any direct way--such as borrower solvency, liquidity, or leverage ratios—despite the likelihood that such 
a proxy would prove very useful.  There are two reasons for this. First, the Loanware database does not 
provide a machine readable identification code (i.e., CUSIP or Datastream identification number) for 
borrowers, so there is no feasible method of matching borrowers to their corresponding accounting or 
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stock price data. Second, it is not at all clear that debt or liquidity ratios for PF borrowers would be 
comparable to similar ratios for borrowers of other syndicated loans. Whereas the borrower of all other 
types of syndicated credits is usually an operating company, which promises its entire faith and credit to 
repayment of the loan, the PF borrower is, by definition, a vehicle company without external assets or 
sources of repayment. Thus the implied corporate backing for a syndicated loan to, say, Enron is 
fundamentally stronger than the backing for a loan to a vehicle company being sponsored by Enron—
even if Enron is the sole project sponsor. Other things equal, this lack of corporate guarantee of loan 
repayment should make these loans riskier and thus more expensive than other types of loans. The key 
question we hope to answer is whether the project financing structure is sufficiently good at overcoming 
agency problems, and/or at reducing contract monitoring and enforcement costs, to overcome this lack of 
corporate backing. If so, PF loans will not be more expensive than other loan categories—and may even 
have lower spreads. 
 Table 5 presents the results of estimating equation 1 using each of the five loan samples discussed 
in section 3. We must begin by estimating these samples separately—only if we find they are priced in a 
single integrated market can we estimate the full sample of all syndicated loans in a single regression. The 
regression intercepts for each loan sample are comfortingly close to the univariate loan price (spread) 
averages presented in Panel B of Table 4, and also show similar relative patterns (highest for corporate 
control, lowest for fixed asset-based loans). The intercept for PF loans, 131.4 basis points, is in fact less 
than two basis points different from the average spread presented in Table 4’s Panel B (130 bp). The PF 
intercept is also the second lowest of any loan sample. This finding, coupled with the univariate test 
results showing that PF loans have significantly lower spreads than other loan groups, clearly suggests 
that project finance lending has competitive advantages over other loan forms—at least for funding 
certain projects.  
**** Insert Table 5 about here **** 
 The second line of Table 5 details the influence of loan size on spreads, which is insignificant for 
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project finance but negative and significant for all other loan samples. The coefficient values for size on 
non-PF loans ranges from –0.02 to –0.06, with a weighted average of around –0.05. This suggests that 
increasing the size of a non-PF syndicated loan by $100 million will reduce the required loan spread by 
an average of 5 basis points. This negative size/spread relationship could be due to economies of scale in 
arranging non-PF syndicated credits, or it could be due to better known and more creditworthy borrowers 
being able to arrange larger loans. Since size is not a significant influence on PF loan prices, we do not 
attempt a further analysis here. Clearly, however, this finding merits further study. 
 Loan term is a second variable that behaves differently for project finance than for any other loan 
type. Whereas spread and maturity are significantly, positively related for all other loan categories, they 
have a significant negative relationship for PF loans. The coefficient value for term indicates that booking 
a loan with an original maturity one year longer than the median reduces the average project finance loan 
spread by 0.89 basis points. A one year increase in maturity would increase spreads for other loan 
categories--by up to 9.1 basis points for corporate control loans. Since PF loans have an average (and 
median) maturity that is more than twice that of most other loan types, this result is readily explainable 
(without a negative spread/term relationship, long tenor loans would be prohibitively expensive), though 
still surprising.  
 While finding a consistently significant, negative relationship between spread and guarantee 
across all loan samples is not surprising, the dispersion in coefficient values definitely is. Whereas the 
presence of a third-party guarantee reduces the spread on a typical capital structure loan by only 3.7 basis 
points, a similar guarantee reduces the spread on project finance loans by almost 43 basis points. No other 
loan category has nearly this sensitivity to third-party guarantees; the next highest value, -19.6 basis 
points for corporate control, is less than half as large. This result also shows why PF borrowers are so 
much more willing than are most other borrowers to incur the cost (in time, effort, and cash) required to 
arrange guarantees. The payoff, in terms of a reduced loan price, is much larger. 
 In yet another surprise, the currency risk dummy has a significantly negative relationship with 
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loan spreads for every loan category. This finding suggests that a mismatch in the currency of the 
borrower’s home country and the currency of loan repayment significantly reduces the rate charged on an 
average loan--by 42 basis points for PF credits and by up to 99 basis points for general corporate purpose 
loans.  One obvious interpretation of this is that banks offer lower rates to international borrowers who 
are willing to accept the risk of borrowing in dollars or another hard currency, though it is not clear why 
this would not be offset by increasing borrower default risk.  
An alternative, more intriguing, explanation for the negative spread/currency risk relationship is 
that it might be the result of a yield premium charged to U.S. borrowers. Various empirical permutations 
of this database consistently yield the result that American corporate borrowers pay higher rates for loans 
of a given size, maturity, and purpose than do non-U.S. borrowers. We can offer three possible 
explanations for this U.S yield premium. First, it could be that more American corporations have access 
to the syndicated loan market than do companies from other countries—implying that the average credit 
rating of US borrowers will be lower. Second, it could be that a larger fraction of U.S. than non-U.S. 
syndicated lending is for takeover financing, which as we’ve shown is on average larger and carries a 
higher spread than does any other type of loan. This type of lending may also offer banks higher spreads 
because of the corporate borrower’s need to arrange large credit lines both rapidly and discretely. The 
third possible explanation is that there are institutional features (inadequate competition, increased 
litigation risk, greater compliance costs, etc.) of the syndicated loan market in the United States that act to 
increase loan rates charged to all American corporate borrowers relative to rates charged to non-U.S. 
borrowers. This finding also merits more in-depth analysis than we can provide here.  
The final variable in Table 5, collateralizeable assets, is always significant—though it has a 
negative relationship with spread for corporate control, general corporate purpose, and capital structure 
loans, and a positive relationship with spreads for PF and FAB credits. This means that, for most loans, a 
borrower in a collateralizeable asset-rich industry will be charged a lower interest rate than will borrowers 
in other industries, but the reverse is true (with roughly equal force) for project finance and FAB lending. 
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The negative coefficient for most loans is what we expected—tangible assets should generally support 
debt better than other types of assets. The positive relationship for PF and FAB could have two 
explanations. First, it could result from the fact that these types of loans are already concentrated upon 
funding tangible asset-rich projects, and that the specific industries chosen as “collateralizeable” happen 
to be relatively riskier than average. Alternatively, it may simply be that riskier projects can be funded 
using PF or FAB loans than could otherwise be arranged. This is consistent with other loan pricing 
studies which document that the use of collateral is positively related to loan spreads (Berger and Udell 
(1990), Booth (1992), and Blackwell and Winters (1997)). We examine this further below for PF loans.  
Panel B of Table 5 examines whether the five loan categories in Panel A are priced in segmented 
or integrated capital markets. A Chow test of structural change is used to test the hypothesis that PF and 
non-PF loans are functionally equivalent financial instruments priced in a single market. In essence, we 
are testing whether the loan pricing factors examined in Panel A are significant in both the PF and non-PF 
regressions and, if so, whether they have the same coefficient values. The Chow test statistics in Panel B 
are all significantly higher than the critical levels, so we must reject the idea that PF loans are funded in 
the same market as are other loan classes. PF loans are thus distinctly different financial instruments from 
other types of syndicated credits, and this means we cannot pool all of our loan observations into one 
single loan pricing regression. Unfortunately, this also means that we cannot directly test whether PF 
loans have significantly lower spreads than other types of syndicated credits by including a PF dummy 
variable in a loan pricing regression of a sample of all loans. Instead, the next section will focus 
exclusively on PF loans, as we examine the influence of borrower nationality, covenant usage, loan fees, 
credit risk ratings, and (project) leverage on PF loan pricing. 
  
5. Determinants of project finance loan pricing 
 The Loanware database provides varying amounts of information about project finance credits, 
depending upon factors such as loan size, nationality of borrower, and especially the date the loan is 
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signed. Larger and more recent loans typically have complete information on all of the variables used thus 
far in our pricing regressions, plus information on covenant usage, fee levels, and borrower (vehicle 
company) credit rating, whereas smaller and older loans tend to have much less detailed data. Virtually all 
PF loans booked since 1994 also provide total project size (in US$ millions), which allows computation 
of a leverage ratio—at least a measure of the total value of all the PF loan tranches divided by project 
size.  Rather than restrict ourselves to analyzing a single sample with all of this information available 
(which would yield a sample size of less than 100 loans), we study four different PF loan samples, 
grouped based on the availability of key data items. These samples are described in Table 6.  
**** Insert Table 6 about here **** 
5.1. Determinants of spreads for the high-information project finance loan sample 
Columns 1 through 6 of Table 6 present expanded loan pricing results for the full-information 
sample of 1803 PF loans, using the same variables as in Table 5 plus a dummy variable proxying for 
covenant usage and another dummy variable indicating whether the borrower is located in the United 
States. The first column employs all of the loan-specific and country risk variables employed before, plus 
covenant usage and the US borrower dummy variable. Columns 2 through 4 use, respectively, the country 
risk rank, currency risk, and US dummy variables by themselves, while the next two columns incorporate 
first risk rank together with currency risk (excluding the US dummy variable) and then currency risk and 
the US dummy together (excluding rank). This empirical design is necessitated by the fact that the 
country risk rank, currency risk, and US dummy variables are highly correlated with each other (the pair-
wise correlation coefficients have absolute values of between 0.65 and 0.82).  
No matter how the risk measures are expressed, all of the other variables in the high-information 
PF sample regressions yield consistent results. The intercept falls between 106.6 and 142.9 in all six 
regressions, and the size and maturity variables are always insignificantly negative. Furthermore, the 
presence of a third-party guarantee always significantly reduces loan spreads (by between 35.3 and 49.2 
basis points), while lending to a borrower in a collateralizeable asset-rich industry always increases 
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spreads (by between 14.3 and 21.2 basis points). Whenever employed, the country risk rank variable is 
also significantly positive, indicating that lending to a borrower with a rank of 30 versus one with a rank 
of 20 will increase loan spreads by between 11.7 and 15.2 basis points. All of these results are 
reassuringly similar to those documented earlier in Table 5, so it is clear that simply adding the covenant 
usage variable to all six regressions does not fundamentally alter the loan pricing results. Insertion of at 
least one covenant in a credit, however, does significantly increase PF loan spreads (by between 51.1 and 
73.5 basis points). The most logical interpretation of this result is that covenants are added to PF loans, as 
opposed to the detailed covenants included in the supporting project financing credit packages, only for 
the most risky credits. Since covenants are observed in only 3 percent of PF loans, their use has a 
magnified impact on spreads. 
Not surprisingly, given the high correlation between the three country and currency risk 
variables, interpreting the separate effects of currency risk and the US dummy variable is rather 
problematic. We have seen that country risk rank is consistently and significantly positive—with a stable 
coefficient value—whenever employed. However, currency risk is significantly positive in two 
regressions and significantly negative in two others, while the US dummy variable is only significant 
(positive) in one of three regressions. Our conclusion regarding the impact of these variables must 
therefore be tempered. Nonetheless, a comparison of columns 1 and 5 and columns 3 and 6 indicates that 
the presence of multicollinearity between country risk rank and currency risk seems to be causing a 
switch in the currency risk coefficient between the two sets of regressions. This suggests that the currency 
risk dummy is best interpreted when it is reported in regressions excluding country risk rank and US 
borrower dummy. In these regression, as reported in columns 3, 8, 10, and 12, currency risk – when 
priced – has a positive impact on spreads. Furthermore, column 1’s regression suggests that US borrowers 
must pay a 26.8 basis point premium over what borrowers from other countries are charged for otherwise 
similar project finance loans. 
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5.2. The impact of fees on loan pricing 
Columns 7 and 8 of Table 6 present the results of our loan pricing regressions for a sub-sample of 
661 loans with complete fee information. These two regressions examine whether loan spreads and fees 
are complements or substitutes. In both cases, the coefficients on the (maximum) participation fee and 
initial commitment fee variables are significantly positive, suggesting that fees and spreads are 
complements. On average, each additional basis point increase in the maximum participation fee increases 
the loan spread by 0.53 bp, while each additional basis point of initial commitment fee increases the 
spread by 1.22 bp. The most logical interpretation of these findings is that banks are enticed to participate 
in riskier loans by being offered both higher fees and higher spreads. Not surprisingly, including fees in 
the regression also significantly reduces the regression intercept, though it remains significantly positive 
in both regressions. These regressions also have by far the highest explanatory power (adjusted R2 values 
of 0.40) of any of the estimations presented in Table 6. 
With the exception of loan size, all of the other variables in the fee sample regressions have the 
same sign as in the full-information loan regressions (columns 1-6 of Table 6), though maturity is now 
significantly negatively related to spread (as it was in Table 5). The coefficient on loan size, however, is 
significantly positively related to spread, though the coefficients on this variable in columns 7 and 8 
indicate that increasing loan size by $100 million will increase spreads by an average of only 0.6 basis 
point. 
5.3. The impact of credit risk on loan spreads 
 As mentioned earlier, it is extremely difficult to generate standard leverage, liquidity, and 
solvency measures for project finance loans. This is both because the Loanware database does not 
provide a machine-readable borrower code that would allow matching of loan data with company-specific 
accounting information from other databases and because the stand-alone structure of a project finance 
vehicle company renders its indebtedness measures non-comparable to those of an operating company.  
We can, however, generate internally consistent solvency and leverage ratios for two sub-samples of 
 
 27 
project finance loans.  
  First, columns 9 and 10 of Table 6 present loan pricing regression results for a sample of 193 PF 
loans which have a credit rating for long-term or short-term debt (or both) from either Moodys or 
Standard and Poors. These provide an indirect measure of a vehicle company’s perceived credit risk. 
Loanware includes four fields that can be used to measure a borrower’s credit rating. These are the 
Moody’s and S&P ratings for the (overall) vehicle company, plus the separate Moody’s and S&P ratings 
for the company’s long-term debt.  In order to maintain as large a sample as possible, we include all loans 
that contain at least one rating from any of these four possible rating fields.  For loans with more than one 
rating, the average of all ratings is used. In order to convert the rating Aaa1, Aaa2, Aaa3, Aa1, Aa2, etc 
into a number, the ratings are ranked and a better rating receives a lower number. Thus, the higher the 
number, the riskier the loan. For example: Aaa1= 0.75, Aaa2 = 1.00, Aaa3 = 1.25, etc for Moody’s rating. 
For S&P’s rating, AAA+ = 0.75, AAA = 1.00, AAA- = 1.25, etc. This coding of the variable borrower 
rating implies that it will have a positive coefficient, since the higher the rating (the higher the default 
risk/credit risk of the borrower) the higher the number coded for the borrower rating variable and the 
higher the spread.  
The loan pricing regressions for the ratings sub-sample, presented in columns 9 and 10 of Table 
6, show exactly the results expected. A one unit increase in credit risk rating (corresponding to a change 
from, say, AAA to BBB) is associated with a significant 30.1 to 34.1 basis point increase in a loan’s 
spread. Note also that inclusion of a direct measure of credit risk has a dramatic impact on the regression 
intercept, causing it to become significantly negative in both regressions (with an average value of –58 
bp). The coefficients on loan size and loan term are both insignificant, while covenant usage, lending to a 
collateralizeable asset-rich borrower, and country risk rank all remain significantly positively related to 
spread. As always, the presence of a third-party guarantee significantly reduces a loan’s price, but both 
the US dummy variable and the currency risk measure are insignificant. Each of these regressions 
explains a non-trivial fraction of the total variation in observed loan spreads, yielding adjusted R2 values 
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of 0.31 and 0.34, respectively. 
The final two columns of Table 6 present the results of loan pricing estimations of a sample of 
192 PF loans booked after 1994. From 1995 onwards, Loanware consistently provides the total size of 
projects (in $US millions) funded by PF lending, as well as the total value of all loan tranches. Dividing 
the total tranche value by the total project value yields a leverage ratio that can be compared across post-
1994 PF loans. The average leverage ratio thus estimated, 0.67, verifies the commonly-held view that 
project financing involves a very high level of debt.8 As expected, project leverage is highly positively 
correlated with loan spread. The coefficients for the leverage variable in the regressions presented in 
columns 11 and 12 average a significant 63.6, implying that increasing a project’s leverage from, say, 
0.60 to 0.70 would cause loan spreads to increase by about 6.4 basis points.  
Incorporating a direct leverage measure into the loan pricing regressions once again causes the 
two intercepts to have significant positive values—though the difference between the two intercepts, 
almost 42 basis points, is uncomfortably large (45.7 bp versus 87.6 bp). As has frequently been the case, 
loan size and term are insignificantly related to spread, while the coefficient on country risk rank remains 
significant and positive and that on guarantee is still significantly negative. For the first time, both the 
collateralizeable asset and covenant usage variables’ coefficients are insignificant, as is currency risk in 
the more extensive model (when it is included along with rank and the US dummy). Also in this model, 
the US dummy variable is significantly positive, implying that an American project would be charged a 
rate 51.9 basis point higher than an otherwise similar project located elsewhere.  
 
6. Estimating an organizational choice model of project finance lending 
 We conclude our empirical analysis of project finance lending by examining whether it is 
possible to predict when project finance lending will be used to fund specific projects. In order to focus 
                                                     
8 As it happens, however, this is actually an under-estimation of total leverage, since it does not include bonds 
issued along with syndicated loans in many projects. Using a sample of 137 loans with complete information on the 
total equity contributions for individual project financings, we compute a “total” leverage ratio of 0.71. 
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on the variables that we have, and also to finesse the influence of industry and investment opportunity set 
on the organizational structure choice, we examine only PF and non-PF loans made to borrowers in 
industries with at least 100 project finance loans.  We thus examine whether it is possible to predict if a 
particular loan made to a borrower in, say, the oil and gas industry will be structured as a PF loan rather 
than as a straight syndicated credit, based only on country risk factors and specific characteristics of the 
loan itself (maturity, size, presence of a guarantee, etc.). We analyze the choice between project finance 
and non-project finance lending with both logit and probit regression techniques, using a dummy variable 
coded as 1 if the loan is a project finance loan and zero otherwise. The model we estimate is presented 
very generally in equation 2 below, along with the empirical variables employed:  
 
Probability [Y=1] = F (size, maturity, country risk, currency risk, guarantee) (2) 
 
All variables are the same as defined in equation 1, except that we use both country risk measures—rank 
and score—in separate model estimations for both the logit and probit regressions. Therefore, country risk 
is measured by rank in the first regression, but is measured by score in the second regression. Since loan 
spread is not a variable in this model, the peculiar way that country risk score expresses risk (a higher 
score means lower risk) will not cause difficulties in interpreting the estimation results. The coefficient on 
the risk variable is simply expected to have a negative value for score and a positive value when rank is 
used. 
The probit and logit regressions differ in the assumption each makes regarding the underlying 
distribution. Whereas a logit regression assumes a logistic distribution, a probit assumes a normal 
distribution. As Greene (1990) states, the choice between probit and logit is difficult to justify 
theoretically and both approaches generally lead to similar results. Thus, both models are presented in 
table 7.   
The sample used to estimate our organizational choice model includes all loans in the Loanware 
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database with complete information regarding loan size in US$ millions, loan maturity, loan currency, 
borrower nationality, and date of signing. An additional screen requires that the borrower be from an 
industry that records at least 100 project finance loans during the 1980-1999 study period (see Table 1 for 
a listing). From these initial screenings, we retain those loans extended to borrowers based in a country 
for which either a country risk rank or score is reported in Euromoney in the year the loan is signed. 
These sample selection criteria result in a sample of 22,911 loans with country risk rank information and 
21,928 loans with country risk score information. The difference in sample size is due to the fact that, as 
mentioned previously, Euromoney reported country risk scores for only a few countries prior to 1983. 
The PF and non-PF samples created by these screens are qualitatively similar to the samples used in the 
univariate comparisons and in the loan pricing regressions, though we do not present the sample 
characteristics in the interest of space. A tabulation of these characteristics is available upon request. 
**** Insert Table 7 about here **** 
Our estimation procedure is as follows. First, each sample (one using risk rank, the other using 
risk score) is sorted randomly. The first 20,000 observations from each sample are then used in the probit 
and logit regressions, respectively. The results are reported in Panel A of Table 7. In a second step, an 
optimal cut-off probability is calculated following the approach developed by Palepu (1986). This cut-off 
probability is used to test the out-of-sample predictive power of the model. For the hold-out samples of 
2,911 (country risk rank) and 1,928 (country risk score) loans, we then predict that a particular credit will 
be structured as a project finance loan if its estimated probability--based on the coefficients in Panel A--
lies above the cut-off probability. Conversely, a loan is predicted to be non-project finance if its estimated 
probability lies below the cut-off probability. These out-of-sample predictions are recorded in Panel B of 
Table 7. 
In addition to the estimated coefficients, Table 7’s Panel A also reports the likelihood ratio index 
for each regression. This index can be interpreted as a pseudo-R2 for linear regressions and thus provides 
information about the explanatory power of the model being estimated. The regression results in Panel A 
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reveal that all variables except the project’s size have an influence on the organizational choice. Project 
finance is chosen for longer-term projects, in riskier countries, which face currency risk and are 
guaranteed. These results are the same regardless of the underlying distribution assumed (logit versus 
probit). Also, the two alternative measures of country risk point in the same direction, though the 
coefficients have opposite signs. The positive coefficient on the country risk rank indicates that project 
finance is chosen for higher ranking, thus riskier countries. The country risk score coefficient leads to the 
same conclusion: Project finance is chosen for projects in countries with lower scores, thus higher risk. 
The explanatory power of the model can be evaluated by either looking at the likelihood ratio 
index, which is 21 or 22 percent for all 4 regressions, or by looking at the predictive power of the models 
as represented in Panel B of Table 7. Here, the probit model clearly provides superior results regarding 
the project finance sub-samples, since 73 percent of all project finance loans and about 80 percent of all 
non-project finance loans are correctly predicted using probit regression. Logit provides superior 
predictive accuracy for non-PF loans, averaging about 90 percent for the two samples, but does so at the 
cost of correctly predicting the project finance loan choice only 59 percent of the time. Using either probit 
or logit regression, however, it is worth noting that this simple model correctly predicts the classification 
of a given loan as either PF or non-PF in almost four out of every five cases.  
 
7. Summary and conclusions 
This study compares the financial characteristics of a large sample of limited recourse project 
finance loans to a comparison sample of all non-project finance loans, as well as to various sub-samples 
of non-PF credits classified by loan purpose. Collectively, these samples represent almost the population 
of large syndicated bank loans booked on international capital markets since 1980—over 90,000 loans in 
total, with an aggregate value in excess of $13 trillion. We find that project finance (PF) loans differ 
significantly from non-project finance credits in that PF loans have a longer average maturity, are more 
likely to have third-party guarantees, and are far more likely to be extended to non-US borrowers and to 
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borrowers in riskier countries. PF credits also involve more participating banks, have fewer loan 
covenants, are more likely to use fixed-rate rather than floating-rate loan pricing, and are more likely to 
be extended to borrowers in tangible-asset-rich industries such as oil and gas, real estate, and electric 
utilities.  
Despite being non-recourse finance, floating-rate PF loans have lower credit spreads (over 
LIBOR) than do most comparable non-PF loans. This surprising result clearly indicates that the project 
financing structure solves important agency costs that are inherent in the creditor/borrower relationship, 
and that PF is a very effective method of providing monitoring for large projects with relatively 
transparent cash flows. Also contrary to expectations, we find that PF loans are not larger than non-PF 
loans, but are in fact significantly smaller than corporate control or capital structure loans (two of the four 
non-PF loan samples examined). Though PF and (most) non-PF loans are all syndicated bank credits, our 
univariate comparisons suggest that project finance loans differ rather fundamentally from non-PF credits 
in almost every important aspect.   
The loan pricing regression analyses we perform show econometrically that PF and non-PF 
credits are in fact different financial instruments. Applying the same pricing estimation model to each 
loan type reveals that PF and non-PF loans are funded in segmented capital markets, with spreads on PF 
loans being influenced both by different factors and to different degrees by common factors.  PF loan 
spreads are directly related to borrower country risk, the use of covenants in the loan contract, and project 
leverage. Spreads are also higher when a borrower is in a tangible -asset-rich industry, while the presence 
of a third-party guarantee significantly reduces PF loan spreads. Though non-PF loan spreads are 
negatively related to size, and positively related to maturity, these variables do not significantly influence 
PF loan pricing in most of our regression analyses. Our finding that PF loan fees are significantly 
positively related to spreads indicates that fees and spreads are complements, rather than supplements. 
Other aspects of PF loan syndication patterns—such as a significantly greater number of banks 
participating in these credits, and much higher fee levels—also suggest that PF loans are relatively more 
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difficult to arrange than non-PF loans, perhaps due to the dramatically higher average level of country 
risk for PF loans. While direct comparisons of the leverage ratios of project finance vehicle companies 
and the operating companies that arrange most syndicated loans are not possible, we do find that projects 
funded with PF loans are indeed heavily leveraged—with an average loan to project value ratio of 67 
percent. 
We complete our study by applying an organizational choice model (using probit and logit 
regressions) to a large sample of loans extended to borrowers in those industries, which frequently use 
project finance. We thus test if it is possible to predict whether a given loan extended to a borrower in, 
say, the airline industry will be structured as a PF or ordinary syndicated credit. Applying our model to 
two hold-out samples of about 2,000 loans each yields a predictive accuracy of almost 80 percent. 
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Table 1 
Industrial distribution of the sample of project finance loans and the population of all syndicated loans 
The first three columns describe characteristics of the sample of loans in the Loanware database with loan purpose 
code listing as project finance, while the next three columns provide similar information for the full sample of all 
syndicated loans in this database with a non-empty loan size entry. The first and fourth columns detail the number of 
each type of loan allocated to borrowers in a particular industry, while the second and fifth columns describe the total 
value (in US$ millions) of loans for each industry. The third and last columns present percentages of the total value for 
each industry. 
     Project Finance Loans   All Syndicated Loans 
Industrial category of borrower Number 
of loans 
Total value 
of loans US$ 
million 
Percent 
of total 
value 
Number 
of loans 
Total value of 
loans US$ 
million 
Percent of 
total value 
Commercial & Industrial 3,136 $386,862 61.0 59,612 $8,391,648 63.1 
  Chemicals, plastic & rubber 105 8,891 1.4 2,340 321,100 2.4 
  Communications 241 51,126 8.1 2,237 510,242 3.8 
  Construction/heavy engineer 222 15,477 2.4 1,434 75,751 0.6 
  Forest products/packaging 135 15,219 2.4 1,988 299,979 2.3 
  Hotels & leisure 298 20,628 3.3 1,992 255,184 1.9 
  Mining & natural resources 300 28,030 4.4 1,452 191,219 1.4 
  Motorway operator 117 14,642 2.3 342 28,636 0.2 
  Oil & gas 631 119,513 18.8 6,061 1,165,320 8.8 
  Petrochemicals 147 24,975 3.9 470 89,359 0.7 
  Steel & aluminum 215 23,488 3.7 2,098 199,275 1.5 
       
Utilities 1,063 $140,609 22.2 4,644 $808,306 6.1 
  Electricity/energy utility 1,009 136,520 21.5 3,942 714,073 5.4 
       
Financial Institutions 167 $21,828 3.4 14,051 $2,461,411 18.5 
Transportation 143 $48,677 7.7 5,781 711,028 5.4 
  Transport (ex. Airlines, ship) 112 46,788 7.4 1,870 319,180 2.4 
       
Government/Agencies 399 $30,602 4.8 3,979 674,869 5.1 
  Government/authority 302 23,333 3.7 2,463 488,359 3.7 
       
Other 48 $5,844 0.9 2,716 251,211 1.9 
       
Total, All Items 4,956 $634,422 100.0 90,783 $13,298,457 100.0 
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Table 2    
Geographic distribution of project finance loans and the population of all syndicated loans 
The first three columns describe characteristics of the sample of loans in the Loanware database with loan purpose 
code listing as project finance, while the next three columns provide similar information for the full sample of all 
syndicated loans in this database with a non-empty loan size entry. The first and fourth columns detail the number of 
each type of loan allocated to borrowers in a particular region (or country), while the second and fifth columns 
describe the total value (in US$ millions) of loans for each region. The third and last columns present percentages of 
the total value for each region. 
     Project Finance Loans  All Syndicated Loans 
Geographic Location of 
Borrower 
Number of 
loans 
Total value 
of loans US$ 
million 
Percent 
of total 
value 
Number 
of loans 
Total value of 
loans US$ 
million 
Percent of 
total value 
Supranational 5 $848 0.1 313 $31,896 0.2 
North America 850 $126,155 19.9 53,694 $8,623,762 64.9 
  United States 727 106,561 16.8 51,401 8,169,735 61.4 
       
Western Europe 673 $157,223 24.8 15,173 $2,613,371 19.7 
  United Kingdom 306 91,751 14.5 6,109 1,230,149 9.3 
       
Eastern Europe 276 $22,046 3.5 1,623 $156,291 1.2 
Middle East 501 $59,286 9.3 2,094 $217,619 1.6 
  Turkey 198 14,468 2.3 813 54,808 0.4 
       
Africa 196 $12,563 2.0 930 $60,549 0.5 
Indian Sub Continent 157 $11,729 1.9 967 $58,459 0.4 
South East Asia 1,503 $151,004 23.8 9,780 $688,046 5.2 
  China 450 29,810 4.7 1,467 89,719 0.7 
  Hong Kong 134 21,689 3.4 1,553 147,766 1.1 
  Indonesia 260 33,210 5.2 1,392 91,912 0.7 
  South Korea 120 8,015 1.3 1,662 85,332 0.6 
  Malaysia 139 17,477 2.8 841 64,965 0.5 
  Thailand 154 17,748 2.8 1,128 64,867 0.5 
       
Australia & Pacific 246 $37,500 5.9 2,266 $395,197 3.0 
  Australia 227 36,221 5.7 1,853 349,251 2.6 
       
Latin America 496 $52,342 8.3 3,303 $370,542 2.8 
Caribbean 52 $3,646 0.6 596 $78,816 0.6 
Other 1 $79 0.01 44 $3,920 0.03 
       
Total, All Items 4,956 $634,422 100.0 90,783 $13,298,457 100.0 
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Table 3 
Financial details of the twenty-five largest project finance deals since 1980  
This table provides financing and contracting details regarding the 25 largest total project finance funding packages arranged since 1980. These are listed by the 
total value of all loans arranged as part of the package, and details of each loan are presented on each line. The launch date is the date the loan is first formally 
proposed by the lead bank and the borrower. Loan size gives the value of these credit in US$ millions (converted into dollars at the contemporaneous exchange 
rate, when necessary), and the borrower name is the formal name of the vehicle company arranging the credit. Location refers to the country where the project is 
located, while the identity of the sponsors is provided in the fifth column, whenever provided in the Loanware database.  Term refers to the maturity of each 
loan, while the column labeled Spread describes a loan’s price, expressed as basis points over the London Inter-bank Offered Rate (LIBOR). Third-party loan 
guarantees, if any, are described in the eighth column, while the purpose of the project finance loan package is described in the final column. 
Loan(s) 
launch 
date 
Loan(s)  
size, $US 
million 
Borrower 
Name(s) 
Project  
location 
Sponsor Names Loan  
Term, 
 years 
Spread over 
LIBOR,  
basis points 
Third 
party 
guarantee 
Loan purpose : 
Jun 90 $13,204 Eurotunnel plc/SA;  
Eurotunnel Ltd;  
Eurotunnel Finance SA 
UK/ 
France 
       ---- 20 yrs 175.0 bp None Refinancing & increased 
funding for cross-
channel tunnel link 
Aug 87 
(canc 90) 
$6,319 
$1,580 
Eurotunnel plc/SA UK/ 
France 
      ---- 18 yrs 
18 yrs 
108.3 bp 
141.7 bp 
None Original Eurotunnel 
financing 
Mar 93 $5,530 Formosa Plastics Corp USA; 
Nan Ya Plastics Corp; Formosa 
Chemicals & Fibre; Formosa 
Pharmaceuticals 
Taiwan      ----- 15 yrs  75.0 bp ---- Construct petro-chemical 
project and port complex 
in Yunlin province. 
Largest Taiwanese 
syndicated loan.  
Feb 93 $1,995 
$1,600 
   $300 
   $170 
   $100 
Qatar Liquified Gas Co. Ltd Qatar Qatar General Petroleum; 
Marubeni; Mitsui; Mobil 
Corp; TOTAL 
12 yrs 
----- 
  9 yrs 
  9 yrs 
  9 yrs 
------ 
------ 
  70.0 bp 
165.0 bp 
------ 
MITI 
------ 
COFACE 
------ 
------ 
Develop $6 bn North 
Field Ras Laffan LNG 
project in Qatar. 
Nov 95 $2,598 
$1,102 
Railtrack plc UK     ---- 5.5 yrs 
5.5 yrs 
  27.5 bp 
  27.5 bp 
---- Genl corp purposes & 
construct Thameslink 
2000 project 
Jan 98 $1,500 
$1,195 
   $500 
NEXTEL Communications USA    ----- 8 yrs 
----- 
8 yrs 
200.0 bp 
------ 
200.0 bp 
---- To build firm’s 
nationwide digital  
mobile radio network & 
working capital 
Sep 97 $2,168 
   $642 
Hutchison Telecommunication; 
Orange plc 
UK    ----- 8 yrs 
8 yrs 
100.0 bp 
100.0 bp 
---- Refinancing of earlier 
project financing. 
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Jan 97 $2,734 Bouygues Telecom France Bouygues Decaux 
Telecom; Bouygues SA; 
Cable & Wireless; US 
West; Faber; BNP-Banexi 
10 yrs  130.0 bp ---- Nationwide rollout of 
borrower’s mobile phone 
franchise. 
Jul 96 $1,281 
$1,036 
   $403 
Athens International Airport Greece    ----- ------ 
------ 
------ 
------ 
------ 
------ 
HERMES Construction of new 
Athend airport. 
Aug 97 $1,363 
$1,223 
Alliance Pipeline LP Canada IPL Energy Inc; 
Westcoast Energy Inc. 
10 yrs 
10 yrs 
120.0 bp 
120.0 bp 
----- Construct pipeline to 
carry natural gas from 
British Columbia to 
Chicago hub. 
Jan 97 $2,500 Rossijkoje A/O Gazprom Russia    ----- 8 yrs 200.0 bp ---- Construct pipeline 
linking Yamal gasfields 
with Europe 
Mar 92    $770 
   $690 
   $500 
   $482 
Castle Peak Power Co. Ltd. Hong 
Kong 
China Light & Power (CLP 
Power); Exxon Corp. 
20 yrs 
13.1 yrs 
20 yrs 
20 yrs 
  62.5 bp 
  53.9 bp 
  75.0 bp 
------ 
ECGD 
------ 
COFACE 
US EXIM 
Construct Black Point 
Power Station at Castle 
Peak in Hong Kong. 
Nov 93 $1,700 
   $720 
Republic of Korea;  
Seoul-Pusan High-Speed Rail 
Korea    ------ 17.5 yrs 
15 yrs 
  75.0 bp 
  56.0 bp 
COFACE 
------ 
Purchase TGV trains for 
Seoul-Pusan rail link. 
May 97 $1,200 
   $581 
   $387 
   $232 
Loy Yang Power Projects Pty 
Ltd 
Australia CMS Generation Co; 
NRG Energy Inc 
15 yrs 
10 yrs 
 6 yrs 
------ 
------ 
------ 
------ 
------ 
------ Purchase of Loy Yang 
Power Station, coal mine 
& other assets from Loy 
Yang, wholly- owned by 
state of Victoria. 
Jun 90 $2,324 Midland Cogeneration  
Venture LP 
USA CMS Energy; Dow 
Chemical; Fluor; 
Panhandle Eastern; Coastal 
Corp 
25 yrs ------ ---- Construct 1,370 MW 
cogeneration facility in 
Midland, MI. 
Jan 97 $2,322 Saudi Yanbu Petrochemical; 
Yanpet II Project 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Saudi Basic Group;  
Mobil Corp 
10.5 yrs   52.5 bp ------ Expansion of three 
petrochemical plants at 
Yanbu. 
Jan 95 $2,300 State Development Bank of 
China 
China 
(PRC) 
   ----- 22 yrs ------ COFACE 
(France) 
Construct second phase 
of Daya Bay Nuclear 
Power Station. 
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Jun 95 $2,000 Oman LNG Oman Sultanate of Oman; Shell 
Petroleum; TOTAL; 
Mitsubishi; Mitsui Corp; 
Partex (Oman); Itochu 
12.5 yrs   90.0 bp ---- Construct downstream 
element of $6 bn Oman 
LNG project. 
Jun 97 $2,000 Companhia do Metropolitano de 
Sao Paulo (METRO);  
Line 4 Project 
Brazil     ----- ----  ---- Construct new subway 
line in Sao Paulo 
Dec 94 $1,940 Broadband Lessor Trust; 
Pacific Bell 
USA    ------ 4 yrs  ---- Support commcl paper 
program issued to 
construct Broadband 
network in CA for 
Pacific Bell. 
Oct 95 $1,920 Hutchison Whampao Ltd UK    ----- 8 yrs 150.0 bp ---- Build-out of Orange 
mobile phone franchise 
& refinance existing 
debt. 
Aug 93 $1,900 Telecom Asia Thailand Nynex Corp; Charoen 
Pokphand Group 
---- ------ ---- 2 million line telephone 
expansion in Greater 
Bangkok. 
Aug 96 $1,959 Mercury Personal 
Communications 
UK Cable & Wireless; 
US West 
8 yrs 150.0 bp ---- Refinance existing PF 
loan for mobile phone 
franchise. 
Apr 96 $1,374 
   $458 
TeleWest Communications 
Group Ltd 
UK ------ 9.5 yrs 225.0 bp 
225.0 bp 
---- Build-out of borrower’s 
UK cable-TV franchises. 
Jul 97 $1,692 
   $133 
E-Plus Mobilfunk GmbH Germany BellSouth Corp 9 yrs 
9 yrs 
125.0 bp ---- Rollout of E-Plus digital 
cellular phone network 
in Germany. 
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Table 4 
Characteristics of project finance loans compared to four loan sub-samples and the full sample of all syndicated loans 
Panels A and B present financial details for the full sample of all syndicated loans, plus five sub-samples categorized 
by loan purpose code.  Project finance loans are those made to a vehicle company. Corporate control loans are 
arranged to fund acquisitions, leveraged buyouts, and employee stock ownership plans. General corporate purpose 
loans either list this as their loan purpose code or else have no purpose listed. Capital structure loans are those 
arranged for refinancing, recapitalizations, standby commercial paper facilities, share repurchases, and debtor in 
possession financing. Finally, fixed asset based loans are arranged to acquire property or other mortgage financing, 
aircraft, or shipping. Panel A details samples of loans requiring only that the loan amount be available, while Panel B’s 
samples also require that the loan be priced as a floating-rate spread above LIBOR, and that loan maturity and 
currency be available. Note that in Panel B, the number of loans for which fees or country risk is available is less than 
the number of observations reported in the first row of the panel. For all syndicated loans the sample size is reduced by 
less than 1% when requiring that country risk information is present. When commitment fee or participation fee 
information is required, the sample size of all syndicated loans falls to 11381 and 11727 loans respectively. Panel C 
presents tests of significance for the difference in values between project finance and other loan types for all loans with 
country risk rank information. #  Indicates that the difference between the value for this loan type and the value for 
project finance loans is not significant at the 5% significance level. All other values are statistically significant at the 
5% level or higher. 
Panel A: All loans with $US amount available 
 
 
 
Variable of interest 
 
All 
syndicated 
loans 
 
Project 
finance  
loans 
 
Corporate 
control  
Loans 
General 
corporate 
purpose 
loans 
 
Capital 
structure 
loans 
 
 
Fixed asset 
based loans 
Number of loans 90,784 4,956 10,795 39,653 25,313 4,680 
Total volume, $USm 13,229,278 634,422 2,292,431 4,275,803 5,289,793 410,175 
Loan size, $USm: avg 146 128 212 108 209 88 
     Median 50 52 59 39 65 50 
     Minimum 0.003 0.011 0.067 0.003 0.012 0.050 
     Maximum 15,000 13,204 14,000 7,737 15,000 4,330 
Avg size all tranches, $USm 181 170 345 124 268 102 
Average maturity, years 4.8 8.6 5.1 4.5 3.9 8.1 
Loans with fixed price (%) 5.9 13.9 2.7 4.9 3.9 6.2 
Loans priced vs LIBOR (%) 69.5 38.8 84.6 66.2 70.8 72.5 
Loans to US borrowers (%) 55.8 13.9 68.8 50.3 74.0 20.4 
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Panel B: High-information loans with spreads versus LIBOR 
 
 
 
Variable of interest 
 
All  
syndicated 
loans 
 
Project 
finance  
loans 
 
Corporate 
control  
Loans 
General 
corporate 
purpose 
loans 
 
Capital 
structure 
loans 
 
 
Fixed asset 
based loans 
Number of loans 40,073 1,824 6,266 15,617 13,464 1,468 
Total volume, $USm 8,120,791 322,870 1,709,683 2,038,268 3,759,693 130,824 
Loan size, $USm: avg 203 177 273 131 279 109 
    Median 70 70 85 50 100 60 
Average number of tranches 
Avg spread over LIBOR, bp 
1.7 
134 
2.0 
130 
2.5 
195 
1.4 
113 
1.7 
135 
1.5 
86 
Average maturity, years 4.8 8.6 5.2 4.6 4.1 7.7 
Avg no. of syndicate banks  10.7 14.5 11.9 9.4 11.5 9.6 
Average fee levels, bp 
    Initial commitment fee 
 
30.8 
 
36.9 
 
39.5 
 
28.0 
 
30.8 
 
20.2 
    Max participation fee 36.9 56.3 56.1 30.7 31.6 37.2 
Loans in US dollars (%) 86.8 77.7 84.5 85.6 90.6 78.9 
Loans to US borrowers (%) 56.9 11.6 76.8 44.3 74.3 13.4 
Loans with currency risk (%) 33.1 72.9 10.5 45.3 18.2 71.0 
Loans with covenants (%) 30.5 3.4 41.6 21.3 42.4 7.1 
Average country risk score 90.0 74.6 95.4 87.3 94.1 82.7 
Average country risk rank 12.8 31.8 5.2 16.3 7.4 21.3 
Loans with guarantees (%) 13.3 34.1 6.8 14.3 9.9 34.5 
Loans to collateralizeable      
    asset-rich borrowers (%) 
 
14.2 
 
27.7 
 
8.5 
 
12.4 
 
11.9 
 
69.5 
Panel C: Two-sample t-test assuming unequal variances for loan pricing samples for high-information loans with 
country risk rank 
 
 
Variable of interest 
Project finance loans 
vs corporate control 
loans 
Project finance loans 
vs capital structure 
loans 
Project finance loans 
vs fixed asset-based 
loans 
Project finance loans 
vs general corporate 
purpose loans 
loan size, US$m -6.86 -8.53 5.76 4.57 
maturity, years 32.78 44.26 5.20 39.60 
spread over LIBOR, bp -28.49 -2.76 17.08 7.70 
initial commitment fee, bp -3.87 9.17 18.07 13.50 
maximum participation fee, bp 0.28# 14.49 8.63 16.33 
number of tranches -13.58 7.74 10.60 15.53 
number of syndicate banks 6.94 8.54 12.01 14.53 
US$ denomination (0/1) -6.27 -12.73 -0.62# -7.64 
US market (0/1) -70.29 -74.04 -1.61# -38.44 
collateralizeable assets (0/1) 17.10 14.32 -26.24 14.08 
guarantee (0/1) 23.47 21.08 -0.15# 17.15 
covenants (0/1) -50.49 -64.50 -4.51 -33.35 
currency risk (0/1) 55.81 49.74 1.32# 24.52 
country risk rank 47.69 43.55 14.06 27.25 
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Table 5 
Loan pricing regressions in segmented versus integrated markets 
This table presents an ordinary least squares regression analysis of the determinants of loan pricing spreads for 
the project finance and four other loan type samples. Panel A presents the analysis for each loan type sample, 
while Panel B performs a Chow test to determine whether the samples can be pooled into a single sample. The 
t-statistics are based on heteroskedasticity robost errors according to White (1980) and are reported in 
parentheses. Note that all reported test statistics in panel B are larger than the corresponding critical values. 
Panel A: OLS regression results (dependent variable: spread) 
Loan type Corporate 
control  
Capital 
structure 
Fixed asset 
based  
General 
corporate 
purpose 
Project 
finance 
number of observations  6258  13428  1449  15429  1803 
Adjusted R2 
 
 0.16  0.17  0.14  0.17  0.17 
Independent variables:           
Intercept  160.28 
(36.63) 
 148.32 
(77.66) 
 104.07 
(20.54) 
 140.13 
(85.20) 
 131.37 
(20.94) 
Loan size (US$m)  -0.04 
(-9.24) 
 -0.05 
(-15.36) 
 -0.02 
(-4.07) 
 -0.06 
(-12.62) 
 -0.01 
(-1.33) 
Maturity (years)  9.11 
(12.82) 
 3.12 
(8.85) 
 0.11 
(0.21) 
 0.68 
(2.47) 
 -0.89 
(-2.00) 
Guarantee (0/1)  -19.54 
(-4.16) 
 -3.70 
(-1.41) 
 -5.44 
(-1.68) 
 -3.98 
(-2.22) 
 -42.67 
(-11.27) 
Currency risk (0/1)  -62.11 
(-13.55) 
 -94.54 
(-37.36) 
 -57.99 
(-11.52) 
 -98.87 
(-47.59) 
 -42.16 
(-6.95) 
Country risk rank  1.23 
(4.63) 
 0.76 
(7.23) 
 0.59 
(4.09) 
 1.51 
(21.77) 
 1.50 
(10.87) 
Collateralizable assets (0/1)  -17.42 
(-4.09) 
 -11.91 
(-4.63) 
 20.50 
(5.05) 
 -6.59 
(-3.33) 
 15.99 
(3.75) 
Panel B: Chow test for differences in pricing factor coefficients  
 CC CS FAB GCP 
Capital structure (CS) 185.08    
Fixed asset based (FAB) 132.39 22.40   
General corporate purpose (GCP) 361.69 45.33 12.30  
Project finance (PF) 95.54 40.35 41.71 50.06 
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Table 6 
Regression analyses of the determinants of project finance loan spreads (loan pricing). 
This table presents the results of an ordinary least squares regression analysis of the determinants of loan pricing spreads for the full project finance and for various project 
finance sub-samples created based upon data availability. Columns 1 through 6 analyze the full project finance loan sample, with various combinations of country risk variables 
added singly and in combination. Columns 7 and 8 examine a sample of project finance loans that also have complete information on the loan fees charged. Columns 9 and 10 
examine a sample of loans with credit ratings data, while columns 11 and 12 present regressions of a sample of loans with data on the $US amount of total project size. This 
allows a leverage measure to be calculated. T-statistics are based on heteroskedasticity robost errors according to White (1980) and reported in parentheses. * indicates that the 
reported coefficient is not statistically different from zero at the 5% level.  
 
 
 
 
Explanatory variables 
[1] 
All PF 
loans 
[2] 
All PF 
loans 
 
[3] 
All PF 
loans 
 
[4] 
All PF 
loans  
[5] 
All PF 
loans  
[6] 
All PF 
loans 
[7] 
PF loans 
with fees  
[8] 
PF loans 
with fees  
[9] 
PF loans 
with 
rating 
[10] 
PF loans 
with 
rating 
[11] 
PF loans 
with 
leverage 
[12] 
PF loans 
with 
leverage 
Intercept 106.63 
(14.92) 
102.75 
(17.63) 
134.75 
(20.53) 
142.86 
(28.47) 
120.82 
(18.39) 
129.40 
(18.60) 
57.34 
(6.34) 
62.49 
(7.35) 
-63.61 
(-2.59) 
-50.34 
(-2.03) 
45.73* 
(1.67) 
87.64 
(3.59) 
Loan size (US$m) -0.006* 
(-1.21) 
-0.004* 
(-0.94) 
-0.009* 
(-1.35) 
-0.010* 
(-1.46) 
-0.07* 
(-1.32) 
-0.009* 
(-1.32) 
0.006 
(3.26) 
0.006 
(3.13) 
0.013* 
(1.20) 
0.004* 
(0.36) 
-0.024* 
(-1.79) 
-0.026* 
(-1.80) 
Maturity (years) -0.20* 
(-0.45) 
-0.15* 
(-0.35) 
-0.55* 
(-1.21) 
-0.67* 
(-1.49) 
-0.45* 
(-1.00) 
-0.46* 
(-1.00) 
-1.60 
(-2.87) 
-1.70 
(-3.09) 
1.06* 
(0.80) 
0.90* 
(0.70) 
0.75* 
(0.62) 
0.16* 
(0.13) 
Collateralizeable 
assets (0/1) 
14.33 
(3.37) 
21.22 
(5.13) 
18.55 
(4.13) 
16.69 
(3.67) 
15.66 
(3.73) 
18.07 
(3.97) 
25.84 
(4.99) 
27.42 
(5.22) 
28.18 
(1.91) 
28.14 
(1.93) 
16.26* 
(1.26) 
15.09* 
(0.27) 
Guarantee (0/1) -42.41 
(-11.31) 
-49.24 
(-13.43) 
-38.14 
(-9.41) 
-35.31 
(-9.19) 
-42.92 
(-11.44) 
-37.87 
(-9.34) 
-34.14 
(-7.34) 
-32.25 
(-7.05) 
-34.16 
(-3.01) 
-28.98 
(-2.59) 
-49.70 
(-3.44) 
-48.25 
(-3.23) 
Covenant usage (0/1) 52.62 
(4.52) 
73.54 
(6.73) 
56.22 
(4.50) 
51.12 
(3.94) 
61.26 
(5.51) 
52.79 
(4.05) 
52.57 
(3.00) 
45.67 
(2.45) 
45.48 
(2.13) 
30.43* 
(1.57) 
-11.42* 
(-0.50) 
2.74* 
(0.13) 
Country risk rank 1.57 
(11.61) 
1.17 
(11.19) 
  1.52 
(11.36) 
 0.52 
(2.68) 
 1.12 
(3.23) 
 1.73 
(3.00) 
 
Currency risk (0/1) -26.15 
(-4.12) 
 9.80 
(1.97) 
 -36.31 
(-6.03) 
14.36 
(2.65) 
-8.33* 
(-1.10) 
0.93* 
(0.17) 
-1.58* 
(-0.14) 
7.79* 
(0.76) 
3.23* 
(0.16) 
51.93 
(4.12) 
US borrower (0/1) 26.77 
(3.73) 
  -0.04* 
(-0.01) 
 10.43* 
(1.48) 
15.00* 
(1.60) 
 22.22* 
(1.21) 
 45.31 
(2.15) 
 
maximum 
participation fee (bp) 
      0.51 
(5.42) 
0.55 
(5.77) 
    
initial commitment 
fee (bp) 
      1.18 
(7.11) 
1.26 
(7.99) 
    
borrower rating         30.11 
(5.51) 
34.09 
(6.25) 
  
project’s leverage 
level  
          65.95 
(2.07) 
61.18* 
(1.84) 
             
Adjusted R2 0.19 0.16 0.07 0.06 0.19 0.07 0.40 0.40 0.34 0.31 0.18 0.12 
Number of 
observations 
1803 1803 1803 1803 1803 1803 661 661 193 193 192 192 
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Table 7 
Organisational Choice between Project Finance and Non-Project Finance Structure 
This table presents the results of estimating an organizational choice model on two samples of syndicated loans 
which contain full information regarding loan size, loan maturity, borrower nationality, loan currency, loan 
guarantee, and either country risk rank or country risk score. The resulting two samples are randomly sorted and the 
first 20,000 observations are used for the regression analysis in panel A, whereas the remaining observations are used 
for the out-of-sample prediction reported in Panel B. The objective is to determine if the actual choice of 
organizational form—project finance versus ordinary loan format—can be predicted based upon observed 
characteristics of the loan and the borrower. In Panel A, T-statistics are in parentheses. Panel B reports results of the 
out-of-sample prediction using optimal cut-off probabilities as promoted by Palepu (1986). 
Panel A: Probit and Logit Regression Results 
 Probit Regression 
1 
Probit Regression 
 2 
Logit Regression 
1 
Logit Regression 
2 
number of observations 20000 20000 20000 20000 
Likelihood Ratio Index (R2) 
 
0.21 0.22 0.21 0.22 
Independent variables: 
 
    
Intercept -2.40 
(-78.51) 
-0.43 
(-4.96) 
-4.34 
(68.49) 
-0.88 
(-5.64) 
Loan size (US$) -0.00 
(-0.21) 
0.00 
(0.28) 
0.00 
(0.22) 
0.00 
(0.53) 
Maturity (years) 0.13 
(41.23) 
0.13 
(41.49) 
0.24 
(40.17) 
0.24 
(40.13) 
country risk ranking 0.01 
(22.07) 
 0.02 
(21.71) 
 
country risk score 
 
 -0.02 
(-22.27) 
 -0.03 
(-21.82) 
currency risk (0/1) 0.14 
(4.29) 
0.11 
(3.15) 
0.30 
(4.93) 
0.23 
(3.65) 
guarantee (0/1) 0.14 
(4.38) 
0.12 
(0.75) 
0.24 
(4.15) 
0.20 
(3.27) 
Panel B: Out-Of-Sample Predictive Power 
 Probit Regression 
1 
Probit Regression 
 2 
Logit Regression 
1 
Logit Regression 
2 
number of observations 2911 1928 2911 1928 
optimal cut-off probability 0.1455 
 
0.1459 0.1126 0.1116 
PF sub-sample:     
number of true PF loans  349 228 349 228 
number of predicted PF loans 256 166 207 135 
% of PF loans correctly 
predicted 
73.4% 72.8% 
 
59.3% 59.2% 
Non-PF sub-sample:     
number of true Non-PF loans 2561 1699 2561 1699 
number of predicted non-PF 
loans 
2020 1386 2293 1546 
% of non-PF loans correctly 
predicted 
78.9% 81.6% 89.5% 91.0% 
 
